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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
PEPPERIDGE FARM, INC. ,
Plaintiff,

v.
THE BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT
OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
INDUSTRIAL COMM I SS ION OF UTAH;
JOHN I. JOHNSON; and AUSTIN C.
NOLI SA,

Case No. 16655

Defendants.

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
H~TRODGCTICN

This action was filed with the Utah Supreme Court
seeking judicial review and reversal of the decision of the
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, which
allowed two claimants, John I. Johnson and Austin C. Nolisa, to
receive unemployment compensation from December 19, 1978 to
January 27, 1979.

Pepperidge Farm, Inc. filed its brief on

October 26, 1979 and the brief of the defendant was filed on
November 21, 1979.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
CONCLUSIONS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW.

The defendant Industrial Commission suggests that the
Utah Supreme Court, in reviewing the decision of the Board of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Review in the instant case, should merely affix its rubber
stamp of approval and affirm the decision.

The purpose of

providing judicial review, however, is to determine whether
decisions made by the Industrial Commission are proper and
supported by substantial evidence, and the process is not as
automatic as the defendant assumes.
In reviewing decisions of the Industrial Commission,
the Supreme Court is required to review the record below.
Martinez v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Securit:Y,
25 Utah 2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587, 588 (1970); Denby v. Board of
Review of Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 626, 628 (Utah
1977).

Furthermore, the Court is not bound by conclusions of

the Board of Review and will not substitute missing findings in
order to corrobrate a decision of the Industrial Commission
which is not supported by the record.

Gocke v. Wiesley, 18

Utah 2d 245, 420 P. 2d 44, 46 (1966).
That decisions of the Industrial Commission are not
automatically affirmed was recognized in Peterson v. Industrial
Commission, 102 Utah 175, 129 P.2d 563, at 564 (1942), where
the Utah Supreme Court stated:
But to sustain the conclusion of
the evidence must be substantial evidence,
evidence, evidence upon which a reasonable
judicious mind, may be content to rest its

the Commission
competent
mind, a
judgment.

In the instant case, the decision of the Board of Review
awardi_ng unemployment benefits to the claimants (reversing the
decision of the Appeal Referee) was not supported by el· ther
h decision
substantial or competent evidence and consequently t e
of the Board Review must be reversed.
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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II.

THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT WAS NOT
INTENDED TO SUBSIDIZE AN EMPLOYEE'S EDUCATION.

The Industrial Commission does not dispute that
claimants Johnson and Nolisa terminated their employment and
returned to school or that a justified reprimand by an employer
is not a good cause for termination.

Nor does the Commission

assert that the claimants' unsuccessful efforts to be
reclassified as Plant Services "A" employees constituted a good
cause for quitting their jobs with Pepperidge Farm, Inc.

The

sole contention of the Commission is that the termination of
employment by both Johnson and Nolisa was somehow involuntary
under the circumstances.
The courts have never held, however, that quitting to
return to school full time constitutes an "involunatry"
termination or a tPrminatinn with "good cause."

Rather, the

courts have unanimously agreed that the purpose of the
unemployment system is not to subsidize an employees education,
Keisling v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,

181

A.2d 717, 718 (Pa. 1962); Fentersheib v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 124 A. 2d 375, 376 (Pa.1956)
~es v.

Department of Human Resources Development, 32 Cal

App, 3d 338, 108 Cal. Rptr. 167, 171 (1973), but "to provide a
cushion against the shocks and rigors of unemployment."

Singer

~g Machine Co. v. Industrial Commission, Department of
~ment and Unemployment Insurance, 104 Utah 175, 134 P.2d
479, 485

(1943).
The declared policy of the Employment Security act is

"to establish financial reserves for the benefit of persons

-3-
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unemployed through no fault of their own."
Construction Co. v.

Olof

N~~

Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 521, 24 3

P.2d 951, 958 (1952):

And one 1·1hose mental attitude is

inconsistent with a genuine attachment to the labor market or
who is unavailable for and refuses to accept suitable work for
personal reasons is not entitled to unemployment compensation.
Denby v. Board of Review of Industrial
626, 629

C~~mission,

(Utah 1977); Mills v. Gronning,

(Utah 1978).

567 P.2d

581 P. 2d 1334, 1337

As this Court stated in Johnson v. Board of

Review of Industrial Commission,

7 Utah 2d 113, 320 P.2d 315,

at 316 (1958):
••• [T]he purpose of the Employment Security Act, as stated
by the declaration of policy, is to lt..9:..b_ten the burdens of
unemEl:.Qyment upon the worker and his family and to maintain
purchasing power in the economy.
The design is to nip in
the bud the descending economic spiral which may result
fro!" 11nernr:il0yf'1~nt ana conseq11Prit- loss of ptlrch-'1si.n'] power
which tends to ramify in chain reaction from throughout the
economy. It is reasoned, however, that the Act was not
intended to go beyond that purpose, and that unless it is
carefully administered, the fund will be kept depleted so
that it will not be able to fill in the breach and
stabilize the economy in emergencies as intended.
(Emphasis supplied).
In the instant case the

only compelling circumstance

requirjng both Johnson and Nolisa to quit their jobs with
Pepperidge Farm, Inc., on September 23, 1978 was their desire
and intent to return, full time,

to Utah State University for

Fall Quarter, which began on September 26, 1978, the Tuesday
following their voluntary termination.

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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II I.

THE CUI IMJ1NTS VOLUNTARILY TERMINATED THEIR
EMPLOYMENT' WIT!lOU'l' GOOD CAUSE.

A.

Claimants' Failure To Be Reclassified Did
Not Constitute Cood Cause For Termination

Section 35-4-5(a) of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, disqualifies both claimants from receiving
unemployment benefits from December 17, 1978 to January 27,

1979.
~re

The Industrial Commission contends that the claimants
justified in quitting their jobs due to their failure to

be reclassified as Plant Services "A" employees.

The record,

however, is clear that the reclassification applied only to
those employees working the night-owl shift and that neither
claimant was working that shift.

(R. 00098, 00099).

Furthermore, the plaintiff, at the request of claimants,
reviewed the job reclassification on two separate occassions
ctnd rleterm.ined each time Lhctl: it

WctS

buti1

proper c111d 11ecess,:u:y

because of the greater skills, duties, and responsibilities
required of the Plant Service "A" employees.

(R. 00039, 00043 I

00044).

The failure of either claimant to obtain
reclassification did not constitute good cause for voluntarily
leaving their employment with plaintiff.

The claimants chose

to remain employed for over 16 months after the job
reclassification occurred.
~re

Their responsibilities and wages

the same as all other Plant Service "B" employees, and

each claimant had at least five

(5) separate opportunities to

bid for the position of Plant Service "A" yet, neither Johnson
or Nolisa made any effort to do so.

(R. 00039, 00044, 00098,

-5-
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B.

The Merits Of The Discrimination
Complaints Are Not Before The Court

The Industrial Commission attempts to confuse the
issues by repeatedly mentioning that claimants had filed
complaints of discrimination with the Industrial Commission of
the State of Utah and by pointing out that both Johnson and
Nolisa "are Black".

While the defendant correctly states that

the merits of those discrimination complaints are not at

is~e

in the current controversy before the Supreme Court, the

br~f

of the Industrial Commission is replete with comments arguing
the validity of those complaints and ultimately reduces the
claimants failure to be reclassified as Plant Service "A"
employees as a "racial grievance."

(Defendant's brief at 11).

The Industrial Commission clouds the issues further by
referring the Court to the case of Tavlor v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 378 A. 2d 829 (Pa. 1977).

There,

the merits of the employees complaints of racial discrimination
were before the reviewing court and the claimant, unlike the
current case, had been subjected to racially derogatory
language and slurs from his employees, co-workers and
customers,

in addition to verbal abuse and racial insults.

Furthermore, the claimant had been told by his employer that it
would be too embarrassing if his customers learned that he had
hired a black employee, so he required the claimant to pick up
his paycheck in the basement so that none of the white
customers would see that a black man was employed there.
There is no evidence or even a claim in the instant
case that either Johnson or Nolisa were ever subject to racial
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I

'

insults or verbal abuse while at Pepperidge Farm, Inc. or that
their employer attempted to conceal their employment from the

public.

On the contrary, Pepperidge Farm, Inc. is an equal

opportunity employer and has never discriminated against any
employee because of race or national origin and the fact that
the claimants are black was not a factor in their job

classification and did not effect their opportunity for
advancement.

(R. 00039, 00040).

Moreover, the merits of the

discrimination complaints are not currently before the court
for consideration or review.

The sole issue is whether or not

the claimants are entitled to unemployment compensation, as was

recognized by the Appeal Referee:
Referee:

All right. Now then, concerning this matter
of the discrimination charge, is there any
documentation available at this hearing
concerning that charge and the Industrial
Commission's decision in the matter?
Mr. Green, do you have anything on that?

Referee:

Excuse me, what I asked you about, Mr.
Green, was, "What was the decision of the
Industrial Commission concerning the charge
of discrimination?"

Green:

It's still, still occurring now, it's not
completed. Is that right?

Referee:

All this is, is a notifiction that a charge
has been filed. This is not the decision.

Referee:

So then, actually, in fact, the case is
still pending?

Stokes:

That is correct.
-7-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Referee:

Now, just a moment, Mr. Nol isa, it is not
· t en t ion
·
t o d eterm1ne
·
in
the merits of this mv·
matter of the, your complaint with the
company. That's between you and the
company.
What I have to rule on is this
matter of the allowance of benefits under
the circumstances.

Referee:

If you are here, supposedly, as
representative of Mr. Johnson and I will
listen to your testimony insofar as it is
relevant to his separation, but I am not
going to consider the entire issue of
discrimination as it occurred between these
gentlem2n and the Pepperidge Farms. That is
something that has been filed with another
authority and until that becomes final, I
would have no decision on it. (R. 00092,
00093, 00094, 00101).
(Emphasis supplied).

C.

Plaintiff Was Not Aware Of The Discrimination
Complaints At The Time Claimants Were Suspended
Or Prior To Their Termination

The Industrial Commission also asserts that the
claimants were compelled to terminate their employment because
of acts of discrimination which "intensified after they filed a
discrimination complaint."
however,

Noticeably lacking from the record,

is any evidence supporting the claimants allegations

that they were assigned dangerous or unusually difficult tasks
once they had filed discriminaiton complaints with the
Industrial Commission.

Claimant Nolisa maintains that he was,

on three separate occassions,

"directed to enter and clean a

baking oven while in operation" yet plaintiff's equipment was
never cleaned during operation, and in fact, it was impossible
to even open a baking oven while in operation.

(R.

00040) ·

The Industrial Commission states that "the evidence of
record is abundant and convincing that after the claimants
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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filed their discrimination complaints conditions deteriorated
to the point the claimants were finally compelled to leave
work."

(Defendant's Brief at 9).

Yet, the Industrial

commission resorts to assumptions in its self-serving
conclusion that the claimants had filed their discrimination
complaints before they were suspended on August 29, 1978, a
conclusion entirely unsupported by the record.

The Industrial

Commission further ignores the record in its statement that the
claimants were suspended as a result of the discrimination
complaints they filed.
On August 28, 1978, before the discrimination
complants were even filed, claimant Nolisa was determined to be
insubordiate to his foreman and was suspended for five days
without pay

when he reported to work on the next day.

(R. 00043).

On August 29, 1978 claimant Johnson was also

~spended

(R.

for failure to accept direction from his supervisor.

00037).
The Industrial Commission maintains that the claimants

filed their discrimination complaints in the morning of August
29, 1978 and were consequently suspended when they reported to

work that afternoon.

Not only did the misconduct of Nolisa

giving rise to his suspension occur the day before the
Industrial Commission claims the complaints were even filed,
but the record establishes,

and the attorney for the claimants

agreed, that the claimants did not file their complaint's
alleging discrimination until August 31, 1978, two days after
their suspension by plaintiff. (R. 00062, 00083, 00086, 00100) •
-9-
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Plaintiff did not suspend either claimant in
retaliation for their complaints since both claimants were
disciplined before any complaint of discrimination was even
filed.

Contrary to the defendant's "assumption" the record

establishes that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the
complaints until September 22, 1978 when the claimants picked
up their separation slips, and consequently did not, in
retaliation, force or request either claimant to perform tasks
which were different, additional or dangerous from their
ordindary job assignments.

(R. 00021, 00091).

Notice from

th~

Industrial Commission of the discrimination complaints was not
even mailed until August 31, 1978 and then the notice was
mailed to plaintiff's main office in Connecticut rather than to
its plant in Smithfield, Utah.

(R.

00093, 00093, 00107).

Moreover, no notice of the complaints was mailed to plaintiff's
plant in Utah un itl November 1, 1978, long after both claimants
had quit and returned to school.

(R. 00093, 00105).

Indeed,

contrary to the Industrial Commission's "assumptions," there is
no evidence of any discrimination or that acts of
discrimination intensified after the claimants filed
discrimination complaints or that the filing of the complaints
~as even a factor

in their termination.

Rather, the only

"abundant and convincing" evidence is that plaintiff was not
even aware that either claimant had filed .a complaint alleging
discrimination either at the time they were suspended or at the
time the purported acts of discrimination occurred.
Despite the distorted arguments of the Industrial
Commission, the evidence of record fails to support a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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findi~

that either claimant had good cause for voluntarily terminating
their employment with plaintiff.

The real reason claimants

Johnson and Nolisa quit their jobs with Pepperidge Farm, Inc.
was so they could return to school full time.

The Industrial

commission does not even attempt to dispute the following
evidence:

(1)

that both claimants informed plaintiff on

August 29, 1978 that they were quitting to return to school
(R. 00037, 00042, 00043, 00091);

(2)

that neither claimant had

been attending school during the summer of 1978, nor were they
enrolled at the time they informed plaintiff of their intended
termination

(R.

00092);

(3) that both gave notice that they

intended to quit well in advance of their actual termination
date (R. 00042, 00043, 00082, 00085, 00091); (4)

that the

claimants terminated their employment on the exact date they
stated they would

(R.

00091, 0009 2) ; ( 5)

that the discharge

slips prepared by plaintiff indicated that both claimants had
quit to return to school (R. 00091, 00100, 00101); (6)

that

the claims for unemployment benefits submitted by both
claimants stated only that they had "Quit" (R. 00123, 00124);
and (7)

that both claimants began to attend school at Utah

State University on a full time basis on September 26, 1978,
only three days after they had quit. (R. 00092).
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Board of Review is unsupported by
any substantial evidence of record and the decision of the
Appeal Referee determining the claimants to be ineligible to
receive unemployment benefits from December 17, 1978 to
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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January 27, 1979 and establishing an overpayment of
compensation to claimants should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

l

day of March, 1980.

FABIAN & CLENDENIN

ByD~s:/.el w.

Anderson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
800 Continental Bank Buildi~
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-8900

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
THIS WILL CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF, was mailed via United
States mail postage fully pre-paid to Floyd Z. Astin

&

K. Alan

Zabel, Special Assistants to the Attorney General for the
Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment
Security, 174 Social Hall Avenue Salt Lake City, Utah 84147a
to Michael E. Bolson, Attorney for Claimants, Utah Legal
Services, Inc., 385-24th Street, Suite 522, Ogden, Utah 84401,
on this

day of March, 1980.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
By~~~~~,,--=.--~~~~-.

Daniel

w.

Anderson
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